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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING, ~d 
STEW ART M. HANSON, its 
Commissioners, 
Defendarn.ts. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 8168 
The Public Service Commission of Utah, herein 
refered to as the ''Commission'' issued its ''Order 
to Appear and Show Cause" directed to Provo Trans-
fer & Storage Co. requiring it to show cause why the op-
erating authority heretofore issued to it should not be 
revoked, suspended, or such other penalties imposed as 
are provided by law. (R. 1) 
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At that time Provo Transfer held Certificate No. 
1049 issued to it by the Commission authorizing it to 
operate as a common carrier by motor vehicle of com-
modities generally within Provo City and a 15 mile 
radius thereof. This Certificate No. 1049 was issued 
June 22, 1953 ( R. 28 - 31), signed by all three Com-
missioners and proper tariffs and insurance had been 
filed with the Commission and operations continuously 
conducted. 
On Feb. 1, 1954 the Commission issued its Report 
and Order (R. 8 - 21) in Case No. 3945 after hearing 
evidence on the investigation, and made rather extended 
findings wherein the history of the carrier was reviewed 
and certain "Irregularities and violations of the law'' 
c'Oncluded. These latter were primarily based upon a 
premise since determined by your Court to be false, 
namely that Wallace A. Peterson, djbja Wally's Motor 
Line had no authority to serve between Salt Lake City 
and Provo, and that hence it could not interchange 
traffic at Provo. Then the Commission ordered that 
the Certificate of Provo Transfer be ''cancelled and 
annulled'' effective February 1, 1954, the date of the 
Order. 
A petition for Rehearing was duly filed (R. 23) 
and denied March 1, 1954 (R. 25). From this denial 
the present appeal to your court is taken. More de-
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION, 
TOGETHER WI1TH ITS ORDER DENYING THE PETITION 
FOR REHEARING ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, AND ARE 
IN EXCESS OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLI·C SERV-
ICE COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
POINT TWO 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING AND VIO-
LATES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE RE-
LATING TO SAID MATTERS. 
POINT THREE 
TH.NT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS PREDICATED UPON 
FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS 
SUBSEQUENT AND CONTRARY TO THE DECISION IS-
SUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH IN THE CA;sE OF WALLACE A. PETERSON, d/b/a 
WALLY'S MOTOR LINE, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, ET AL. 266 Pac. (2d) 497. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER DENY TO CARRIERS 
AND THE PUBLIC THE RIGHT OF INTERCHANGE OF 
FREIGHT AS REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE'S AND CON-
STITUTION OF UTAH. 
POINT FIVE 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT SIX 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION, 
TOGETHER WITH ITS ORDER DENYING THE PETITION 
FOR REHEARING ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, AND ARE 
IN EXCESS OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLI·C SERV-
ICE COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
POINT TWO 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS CONTRARY TO 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE HEARING AND VIO-
LATES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE RE-
LATING TO SAID MATTERS. 
This proceeding was initiated by an Order to Ap-
pear and Show Cause which required production of 
all hooks and records and to show cause why its opera-
ting authority should not be revoked, suspended or 
other penalties imposed should it appear that Provo 
Transfer "is not operating in accordance with its oper-
ating authority and the laws of the State of Utah and 
the rules of the Com1nission". No specification of charges 
is made but a grand "fishing expedition" was initia-
ted by the Conunission. 
We recognize the powers and duties of the Com-
lnission under Section 54-G--1-, U.C.A. 1953 to "super-
vise and regulate all common motor carriers" and 
Section 54-6-20 granting it the power "for good cause, 
and after notice and hearing (to) suspend, alter, amend 
or revoke any certificate, permit or license issued by 
it hereunder.'' However, we do not acknowledge that 
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such is an arbritrary, unrestricted power vested in 
the hands of the three Commissioners. 
The Utah Court has c-onsidered Se·ction 54-6-20 
in the case of Fuller Toponce Trucking Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 99 Utah 28 ; 96 Pac. ( 2d) 722. 
That was an application for a certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity wherein a petition for rehearing had 
been duly filed, "but the Commission delayed more than 
twenty days after completion of the rehearing before 
issuing its order revoking the certificate and granting 
a new one. It was held that such did not deprive the 
Commission of its jurisdiction and that the Commission 
still had authority under due process of la-vv to modify 
the original order by which a certificate had been au-
thorized in favor of the applicant. Obviously an en-
tirely different situation existed there as the matter 
had been heard ·on an application for a public conveni-
ence and necessity certificate, the hearing of the matter 
had been ·had, a rehearing requested and granted and 
the rehearing conducted and there was merely a delay 
in the rendition of the decision that had been taken 
under advisement by the Commission. 
If Section 54-6-20, which authorizes the revoca-
tion of certificates, permits or licenses, were to be 
construed as a broad grant of discretionary arbritary 
power, no security of operation could be had by any 
motor carrier and each would be subject to the whim 
of succeeding members of the Public Service Commis-
sion. We submit that such is not the intent or pur-
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pose of the law and that due process and orderly pro-
cedure require that such power be exercised only in 
the event of a substantial change in circumstances or 
wilful and flagrant violation of the laws of the state 
or the rules of the Commission. In other words, ''for 
good cause" is inherent in a statute of this nature. To 
hold otherwise would obviate all constitutional guaran-
tees of due process. 
An administrative body such as the Public Service 
Commission cannot be a law unto itself in all things 
and arbritarily take from a carrier its certificate, as 
a public utility has a substantial invested interest in 
the operations and should not without due process of 
law be deprived of its valuable property right without 
just and substantial cause being shown. 
We call to your attention the fact that Certificate 
No. 1049 had been duly issued, was identical with the 
certificate of the transferror, due notice to the public 
and all competing carriers had been given and no ap-
peal had ever been taken from the Order. No abandon-
rnent of said rights was asserted, rather the Commis-
sion seems to criticise and revoke upon the basis of too 
active service to the public and other carriers. 
Let us look at the reasons set forth by the Com-
mission for this revocation of authority: 
(a) They base the Order primarily upon a his-
torical backgr·ound (R. 14-17) wherein they review a 
series of six Certificates of Convenience and Necessity 
issued by the Commission in succession between 1946 
and 1953 covering succeeding operators in the Provo 
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area. All had Provo City and a 15 mile radial area 
duly authorized. The first was limited to service for 
retail establishments. In 1950 the Commisison issued 
its Certificate No. 919 to Donald Ellison & John A. 
Ellison covering commodities generally within Provo 
City and the 15 mile radial area. This authority was 
reissued on transfers until finally Provo Transfer 
became the holder under its present Certificate No. 
1049. At each step the Commission had before it an 
application specifying the scope of authority and each 
time issued its Order and Certificate reaffirming the 
commodity and area descriptions and each time due 
notice was published as prescribed by the Commis-
sion's own rules. Now they say in essence that they 
could not do just what they had approved in this case 
and many other similar transfer of authority matters 
and thus they will now just cancel everything granted 
to this carrier. 
(b) The Commission found that Provo Transfer had 
interlined or interchanged freight with Wally's Motor 
Line at Provo and such was illegal because Wally's 
Motor Line had no authority to operate between Salt 
Lake City and Provo, Utah. (R. 10, 11, 18 & 19). We 
wish to call the attention of the court to its own de-
cision in the case of Peterson v. Public Service Com-
mission of Utah, 266 Pac. ( 2d) 497 which was decided 
on January 29, 1954, two days prior to the Report and 
Order in this case, wherein your Court held that Peter-
son did have authority under his Certificate 992 to 
transport cormnodjties hetwPPn Salt Lake City and 
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Provo. Apparently the Commission in anger at the 
decision of your Court decided to punish someone and 
took the steps of cancelling the authority of Provo 
Transfer as a means of retribution. 
POINT THREE 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS PREDICATED UPON 
FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS 
SUBSEQUENT AND CONTRARY TO THE DECISION IS-
SUED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH IN THE CASE OF WALLACE A. PETERSON, d/b/a 
WALLY'S MOTOR LINE, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, ET AL. 266 Pac. (2d) 497. 
POINT FOUR 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER DENY TO CARRIERS 
AND THE PUBLIC THE RIGHT OF INTERCHANGE OF 
FREIGHT AS REQUIRED BY THE S'TATUTES AND CON-
STITUTION OF UTAH. 
The Commission found the facts to be that the 
petitioner is a Utah corporation and that after issuance 
of its ·certificate, its principal stock holder, :Miller ne-
gotiated with Mr. Clifford W. Bailey, Mr. Wallace A. 
Peterson and Mr. Clem Tucker for sale of all of the 
corporation stock and that such negotiations were com-
pleted in the office of an attorney in Provo and there-
upon Mr. Clifford W. Bailey and :Mr. Clem Tucker in 
cooperation with ~1r. Peterson undertook management 
of the corporate affairs, assuming that they had com-
plied with all necesary requirements. However, they 
had neglected to file Oaths of Office and complete 
the transfer of the stock, and just prior to the hearing 
on the Order to Show Cause it was discovered that 
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such corporate niceties had not been conformed t·o and 
though de facto officers had been conducting the opera-
tions, technically they had not fully qualified to per-
form such official acts relative to the corporation. Prior 
to the time of the Order to Show Cause the interest 
which Wallace A. Peterson had attempted to acquire 
in the corporation was transferred from him to his 
wife, Helen Peterson, and prior to the hearing the 
stock certificates were duly issued and delivered and 
the Oaths of Office filed, and all corporate procedures 
fully compiled with by the officers and stockholders. 
The Commission reads some sinister meaning into the 
fact that these parties, wholly uniniated in the pro-
cedures of corporate practice, and feeling that their 
counsel in Provo had completed the transaction, never-
theless carried on the corporate affairs in the same 
manner as they would have done had they actually 
fHed their Oaths of Office as prescribed by law. No dif-
ference in procedure is found by the Commission by 
reas·on of this failure to comply with the corporate 
steps, but nevertheless such is used as a primary ground 
for cancellation of the operating authority. 
It is submitted that one of the principles of an 
order to show cause wherein a carrier or individual 
presents itself before the administrative body is that 
such carrier be afforded the opportunity to show that 
it has rectified any defects theretofore existing and 
has compiled with the rules and regulations material 
to the situation at hand. These individuals first be-
came aware of the deficiency in the eorporate re-
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cords when the Order to Show Cause was served upon 
them and without dispute immediately took the neces-
sary steps to comply with the oral requests of the 
Commission's representatives. 
The final basis for the cancellation appears to 
be that Provo Transfer accepted an interchange of 
freight from Wally's Motor Line but did not have on 
file with the Commission such tariffs as in the opinion 
of the Commission prescribed for the interchange of 
traffic. It is submitted that at all times the Provo 
Transfer had on file a tariff prescribing routes and 
rates for the transportation of commodities generally 
thoughout Provo City and the 15 mile radial authority 
covered by its certificate. Testimony was presented 
without dispute that Mr. Peterson, desiring to serve 
the public in the transportation of commodities from 
Salt Lake City to points outside of Prov-o, Utah, but 
within the scope of the Provo Transfer's authority, 
had talked with representatives and commissioners rela-
tive to a "purchased transportation" arrangement by 
which there could be an interchange of freight. He 
was advised that the Commission had not established 
any rules thereon and no written Order as prescribed 
by statute was ever given to Mr. Peterson or to Provo 
Transfer requiring them to cease and desist from the 
inter~hange of freight through the purchased trans-
portation medium, notwithstanding the fact that the 
commisioners and their representatives had full notice 
of the method of interchanging freight. A formal appli-
cation was made to the Commision for establishment 
10 
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of through routes and rates by Provo Transfer and 
Peterson in August of 1953, being I & S Docket No. 
97, but because the Commission claimed that Peterson 
had no authority into Provo, Utah, they refused to 
act upon said formal application for interchange of 
freight and establishment of through routes and rates, 
and held under consideration such request for estab-
lishment of through rates for interlining of freight 
until after its decision in this case and then on Feb. 
10, 1954 finally denied authority to publish such a tariff. 
We wish to call to your attention the fact that 
such a refusal to permit the establishment of through 
routes and rates and the interchange of freight be-
tween these two carriers is in direct violation of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and of the Statutes 
of Utah, and contrary to the established principles 
applied to every other carrier in the State of Utah for 
the interchange of traffic. 
The primary basis of the obligation in such mat-
ters is spelled out by the Utah Constitution, Section 12, 
l~ Article XII, which reads as follows: 
''All railroad and other transportation com-
panies are declared to be common carriers, and 
subject to legislative control; and such companies 
shall receive and transport each other's passen-
gers and freight, without discrimination or un-
necessary delay." 
This is then furthe-r supplemented by Section 54-
3-10, U.C.A. 1953, which reads as follows: 
"INTERCHANGE OF BUSINESS RE-
QUIRED. - (1) Eevery common carrier shall 
11 
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afford all reasonable, proper and equal facili-
ties for the prompt and efficient interchange 
and transfer of passengers, tonnage and cars 
loaded or empty, between the lines owned, oper-
ated, controlled or leased by it and the lines 
of every other common carrier, and shall make 
such interchange and transfer promptly, with-
out discrimination between shippers, passengers 
or carriers as to compensation charged, service 
rendered or facilities afforded. Every railroad 
corporation shall receive from every other rail-
roadcorporation at any point of connection freight 
cars of proper standard and in proper condition 
and shall haul the same either to destination, 
if the destination be upon a line owned, oper-
ated or controlled by such railroad corporation, 
or to point of transfer according to route billed, 
if the destination is upon the line of some other 
railroad corporation. Nothing in this section 
contained shall be construed as in anywise limit-
ing or modifying the duty of a common carrier 
to establish joint rates, fares and charges for 
the transportation of passengers and property 
over the lines owned, operated, controlled or 
leased by it and the lines of other common car-
riers, or as in any manner limiting or modifying 
the power of the commission to require the estab-
lishinent of such joint rates, fares and charges. 
(2) Every telephone corporation and tele-
graph corporation operating in this state shall 
receive, transmit and deliver, without discrimi-
nation or delay, the conversations and messages 
of every other telephone or telegraph corpora-
tion with whose line a physical connection may 
have been made." 
General citations as to the recognized responsi-
bility of carriers to interchange freight may be found 
12 
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at 13 C.J.S. 52 and at 13 C.J.S. 917. The general con-
tent of these citations is that a earrier may be lawfully 
required to provide reasonable facilities to other car-
riers including the facilities for interchange of traffic 
and transportation under its line of freight from a 
connecting line. 
The Commission therefore has condemned the ac-
tion of these two carriers in attempting to provide ser-
vice as requested by the public through interchange 
of freight and has used their efforts to conform with 
the statutory and constitutional requirements as an 
excuse for cancelling these operating rights not with-
standing the fact that the Commission itself stubbornly 
refused to hear or act upon the formal application in 
August of 1953 for tariffs providing for the through 
routes and rates. It is significant that in the present 
case the Commission in its Findings has utterly ig-
nored the evidences of good faith of the carriers in 
not only applying for the tariff as prescribed by law, 
but also in discussing this matter of interchange of 
freight with the Commissioners and with the Commis-
sion representatives in an effort to operate legally and 
provide for the public the service demanded of them. 
POINT FIVE 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT SIX 
THAT THE REPORT AND ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
The exercise of powers by a regulatory body such 
13 
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as the Public Service Commission of Utah must be 
within certain limits and cannot be of an arbritrary 
and capricious character. The record in this case shows 
that the officers of the Provo Transfer & Storage Co. 
at the time of the hearing were Clifford W. Bailey, 
President, Clarence E. Tucker, Vice-President and Helen 
Peterson (wife of Wallace A. Peterson) Secretary-Trea-
surer. It has been shown above that the Commission, 
notwithstanding the decision of this court in Peterson 
v. Public Service Com1nission, whic}: was fully known 
to it, nevertheless still found that ;JStrV~rRiliQr did 
not have authority to serve between Salt Lake City 
and Provo, and stubbornly reaffirmed that position 
after the Petition for Rehearing before this Court 
had been denied, and thus it appears that the Com-
mission has taken an arbitrary and defiant attitude 
in this matter. This is further reaffirmed by the fact 
that said Commission in its Report and Order found 
that Clifford W. Bailey and Mr. Peterson presumed 
to act on behalf of the corporation and did so illegally 
by having failed to file their Oaths of Office and com-
plete the corporate procedures. ''These operations where 
wholly illegal and irregular in that neither Bailey nor 
Peterson were legal officers, stockholders or agents 
of the corporation; ..... " (R. 18) However, immedi-
ately following the issuance of the Order in this present 
case the Commission granted, and still maintains in 
force, temporary authority to the Provo Transfer Co., 
a new corporation organized by Mr. Clifford W. Bailey, 
of which he is also the President, to conduct within 
14 
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Provo City and a 15 mile radius a household goods 
operation. 
You will recall that the records showed that not-
withstanding the broad scope of the authority of Provo 
Transfer & Storage, petitioner herein, the operations 
were divided into two divisions, namely, the household 
goods division and the general commodities division, 
and Mr. Bailey had the exclusive control over the 
household goods division and :Mr. Tucker and Peter-
son had control over the general commodities, being 
principally the freight which was interehanged between 
\V ally's :Motor Line and petitioner. There is no dis-
pute but that a very substantial volume of traffic 
was handled in both of these departments of petitioner. 
We challenge the sincerity and fairness of the 
Co:rnmission in finding on February 1, 1954 that Mr. 
C. vV. Bailey is guilty of illegal and irregular conduct 
of busines and within two weeks granting to his wholly 
owned corporation, bearing substantially the same name 
as petitioner, authority to carry on the very business 
which they found to he apparently unnecessary, illegal 
and irregular. 
The Commisison at no place finds that there is 
not a need for the service that was being peformed by 
petitioner and does not dispute the fact that substan-
tial volumes of freight were being transported for the 
public continuously from August of 1953 and that dur-
ing all of said period there was pending before the 
Commission not only the formal application for estab-
liRhment of through routes and rates, but also the 
15 
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informal request for approval of the lease or purchased 
transportation arrangements so that the public could 
be served while the Commission could make up its 
mind on the tariff matter. 
No specification of violations were made 1n the 
order diTecting the petitioner to appear before the 
Commission and show cause, and hence no opportunity 
was presented for knowing what the Commission would 
rely upon in the cancellation of this valid opera;ting 
authority. We submit that the principles of constitu-
tional law, both of the State of Utah and the United 
States, have been violated in this arbitrary and capri-
cious action by the Commission and desire to refer the 
Court to a recent decision of the U. S. Supreme Court 
wherein the quotation of suspension of a physician's 
license was considered. Therein the Court found in a 
divided 6-3 decision that due process had been followed 
in that particular case, but the following citation is 
a reiteration of the rule as applicable to our situation: 
Barsky v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 98 L. Ed 
545 at 559: 
''This latter ground, if the basis of the 
Regent's action, would indicate that in New York 
a doctor's right to practice rests on no more 
than the will of the Regents. This Court, how-
ever, said many years ago that "the nature and 
theory of our institutions of government .... 
do not mean to leave room for the play and ac-
tion of purely personal and arbitrary power .... 
For, the very idea that one man may be com-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pelled to hold his life, or the means of living, 
or any material right essential to the enjoyment 
of life, at the mere will of another, seems in-
tolerable in any country where freedom prevails 
..... '' Yick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 
370, 30 L ed 220, 226, 6 S Ct 1064. '' 
No standards have been established by the Legis-
lature of the State of Uta:h as a guide to the Public 
Service Commission in the revocation or suspension 
of operating authority. The affirmative guide for the 
granting of authority to a common carrier is the ex-
istence of public convenience and necessity, which re-
quires the performance of the particular service in the 
area involved. The converse of that would seem to 
be that the Commission should find that no public con-
venience and necessity exists for the operation which 
has been cancelled and annulled. However, even that 
has not been spelled out or defined by the Legislature. 
Therefore, under the guise of ''good cause'' the Com-
mission may arbitrarily and for any peculiar reason 
deemed good cause by it, "suspend, alter, amend or 
revoke any certificate.'' Perhaps the Commission in 
this present case by an Order which purports to "can-
cel and annul" has conformed with such statute, bnt 
we doubt that constitutionally it has any grounds for 
this action. 
It is significant that the Legislature has set up 
a different penalty for the type of conduct which the 
Commission purports to find in its Findings of Fact 
in that Section 54-6-18 U.C.A., 1953, provides that a 
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carrier who violates the proVIsions of this act or who 
fails to obey any lawful order, decision, or regulation 
of the commision shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor. Surely the Legislature did not intend that 
action such as is shown by the record in this case and 
outlined in the Findings should be a basis for cancella-
tion of a carrier's authority, particularly where the 
absolute evidence of good faith is shown in the attempts 
of the carrier to publish tariffs, inquire of the Com-
mission for guidance and procure the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah as to the scope 
of connecting carriers authority. Should all of the 
things found to be facts by the Commission be true, 
nevertheless the most that should be imposed on this 
carrier should be the charge of a misdemeanor and not 
the radical cancellation and annullment of its certifi-
cate. 
vV e quote this significant language from the Pet-
<~rson v. Public Service Cmnmission case, supra 2GG 
P. (2d) 497: 
"It is the prerogative of this Court to de-
termine whether the Commission regularly pur-
sued its authority. Under Sec. 54-6-4, U.C.A. 
1953 vesting in the Commission power to regu-
late motor carriers we do not find any author-
ity either directly, or reasonably incident there-
to, by which the Commission could arbitrarily 
refuse to approve a tariff, and, thus nullify the 
rights a carrier possesses under a Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity." 
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CONCLUSION 
This petitioner respectfully submits that the Su-
preme Court should reverse the Order of the Public 
Service Commission and direct that the operating rights 
and authority be restored to the Provo Transfer & Stor-
age Co. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Cont 'l Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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